The notion of a "proof of knowledge" , introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff, has been used in several works as a tool for the construction of cryptographic protocols and other schemes. Yet, the formalizations of this notion appearing in the literature are unsatisfactory and in particular inadequate for some of the applications in which they are used. The purpose of this note is to point out the source to these problems and to suggest a definition which resolves them.
Introduction
The introduction of the concept of a "proof of knowledge" is one of the many conceptual contributions of the work of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [11] . This fundamental work, though containing sufficient intuition and clues towards a satisfactory definition of the notion of a "proof of knowledge", does not provided a formal definition of it. FUrthermore, in my opinion, the formal definitions given in subsequent works (e.g. [15, 3] ) are not satisfactory.
Basic approach in defining proofs of knowledge
Intuitively, a two-party protocol constitutes a "system for proofs of knowledge" if "whenever" one party (called the verifier) is "convinced" 1 then the other party (called the prover) indeed "knows" "something". The excessive use of quotation symbols in the condition of the above statement may provide some indication to the complexity of the notion. For simplicity, let us consider the special case in which the "object of knowledge" is a witness for membership of a common input in some predetermined language in NP. For example, let us consider the case in which the "object of knowledge" is a satisfying assignment for a CNF formula (given as input to both parties). Hence, a two-party protocol constitutes a "system for proofs of knowledge of satisfying assignments" if "whenever" the verifier is "convinced" then the prover indeed "knows" a satisfying assignment for the given formula. The clue to a formalization of "proofs of knowledge" is an appropriate interpretation of the phrases "whenever" and "knows" which appear in the condition. The phrase "convinced" has the straightforward and standard interpretation of accepting (i.e., entering a specified state in the computation).
Following [11] the interpretation of the phrases "whenever" and "knows" is as follows. Suppose for simplicity that the verifier is always convinced (i.e. after interaction with the prover the verifier always enters an accepting state). Saying that the prover "knows" a satisfying assignment means that it "can be modified" so that it outputs a satisfying assignment. The notion of "possible modifications of machine M" is captured by efficient algorithms that use M as an oracle. Hence, saying that the prover "knows" a satisfying assignment means that it is feasible to compute a satisfying assignment by using the prover as an oracle. Namely, there exists an efficient algorithm, called the knowledge extractor, that on input a formula <P and given oracle access to a good prover (i.e. a prover which always convince the verifier on common input <p) is able to output a satisfying assignment to <p. Indeed, this is exactly the interpretation given in works as [15, 3] . The problem is to deal with the general case in which the prover may convince the verifier with some probability £. < 1. Again, for constant £. there is no problem and it can be required that even in this case the knowledge extractor succeeds in outputting a satisfying assignment in expected polynomial-time (or alternatively output such an assignment in polynomial time with probability exponentially close to 1). This interpretation is valid also if £. is any non-negligible function of the length of the input 4> (a non-negligible function in n is a function which is asymptotically bounded from below by a function of the form :C, for some constant c). But what should be required if the prover does not convince the verifier with non-negligible probability? Previous formulations (e.g., [15, 3] and see also Appendix B) require nothing, and hence are unsatisfactory both from a conceptual point of view and from a practical point of view (i.e., in view of many known applications). In particular, this 1
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Provers which convince with probability that is not non-negligible
We start by an abstract justification of our claim that requiring nothing, in case the prover does not convince the verifier with non-negligible probability, is wrong. We first uncover the reason it has been believed that it is justified to require nothing. It has been believed that events which occur with probability which is not non-negligible can be ignored, just as events which occur with negligible probability can be ignored. However, a key observation, which has been overlooked by this argument, is that a sequence of probabilities can be neither negligible (i.e., smaller that ~c for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large n's) nor nonnegligible (i.e., bigger that ~c for some c > 0 and all sufficiently large n). Hence, even if it were justified to require nothing in case the prover convinces the verifier with negligible probability, it is unjustified to require nothing in case the probability of being convinced is just not non-negligible! To demonstrate what is wrong when we require nothing in case the prover does not convince the verifier with a non-negligible probability, we consider the following possibility.
Suppose that there exist a prover and an infinite sequence of CNF formulae, {<Pn : n EN}, such that the probability that the prover convinces the verifier on common input <Pn is -\-, where n is the length of r/>n and k is the number of literals in the longest clause of <Pn. n Furthermore, suppose that, for every k > 0, there exists infinitely many n's such that k is the number of literals in the longest clause of <Pn. An important observation is that the sequence of probabili ties (defined by the above formulae) is nei ther negligible (i .e., smaller that ~c for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large n's) nor non-negligible (i.e., bigger that ~c for some c > 0 and all sufficiently large n). Hence, previous definitions of "proof of knowledge" require nothing (or too little) with respect to the above prover. To appreciate the severeness of the lack of requirement with respect to the above prover consider the following application. Suppose that the proof of knowledge is used as a subprotocol inside a protocol in which Alice will send Bob a satisfying assignment to <Pn if she is convinced by Bob that he already knows such an assignment. We would like to argue that in this application Alice yields no knowledge to Bob (i.e., Alice is zero-knowledge). Using a reasonable definition of "proof of knowledge" one should be able to prove such a statement (and indeed using our definition such a proof can be presented). Yet, the zero-knowledge property of Alice can not be demonstrated using previous formulations of "proof of knowledge". (Typically, the simulator for the zero-knowledge property uses the knowledge extractor (for the proof of knowledge) as a subroutine. However, previous formulations of "proof of knowledge" do not guarantee a knowledge extractor which handles the entire sequence of formulae. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the cases in which something is sent by Alice since these case is not negligible.)
A more concrete and practical setting can help to further clarify our point. It has been suggested to use a "proof of knowledge" as a subprotocol inside a multi-round encryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack (d. [6] Sec. 5 and [12] Sec. 5.4 ). Namely, the decryption module returns a decryption of a chosen ciphertext only if "convinced" that the party asking for it already "knows it". (This is a special case of the application considered in the previous paragraph). Using previous formalizations of "proof of knowledge" it cannot be proved that the above "decryption module" is zero-knowledge (Le., yields no knowledge) 2 inadequacy often appears when "proofs of knowledge" are used as subprotocols inside larger protocols. In other words, the inadequate formulations of "proofs of knowledge" drastically limit their modular application in the construction of cryptographic protocols.
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A more concrete and practical setting can help to further clarify our point. It has been suggested to use a "proof of knowledge" as a subprotocol inside a multi-round encryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack (d. [6] Sec. 5 and [12] Sec. 5.4 ). Namely, the decryption module returns a decryption of a chosen ciphertext only if "convinced" that the party asking for it already "knows it". (This is a special case of the application considered in the previous paragraph). Using previous formalizations of "proof of knowledge" it cannot be proved that the above "decryption module" is zero-knowledge (Le., yields no knowledge) 2 under a chosen ciphertext attack. Yet, the above decryption module is zero-knowledge and this zero-knowledge property (though not proven!) has been used to claim that the particular multi-round encryption scheme is secure against chosen message attack. We stress that the above mentioned encryption scheme is indeed secure under such attacks, it is just that its security has not been proven but rather "hand-waved", and that the essential flaw in the hand-waving is the fact that it is based on an inadequate formalization of proofs of knowledge.
The above example is very typical. In many (yet not all) applications of "proofs of knowledge" one relies on their meaningfulness with respect to arbitrary behavior of the prover. Yet as pointed out above, previous formalizations of "proof of knowledge" are meaningful only in case the prover convince the verifier with non-negligible probability. One should not make the mistake of saying that events which happen with probability that is not non-negligible can be ignored, since such probabilities are not negligible! (Put in other words, negligible is not the negation of non-negligible!)
A few words about the definition presented in this paper
The most important aspect in which our definition deviates from the previous ones is in a "uniform" treatment of all possible provers. Most importantly, there is no sharp distinction between provers based on whether they convince the verifier with non-negligible probability or not. Instead, it is required that the knowledge extractor always succeeds and that the expected number of steps it does is inversely proportion (via a polynomial factor) to the probability that the prover convinces the verifier. In addition, provers are dealt in a uniform manner which is independent of their inner structure. Within this "uniform framework" several choices have been made which are not essential to the presentation of the definition. These choices will be discussed at a later stage.
A Definition of Proof of Knowledge
The most natural and important proofs of knowledge are those of "knowledge of a witness for an NP statement", yet there is no need to restrict attention to these proofs. In general, we consider an arbitrary relation R ~ {O,l}"' X {O,l}" (in the special case of an NP-witness one requires that R is polynomially bounded and in p)2. Our aim is to define a "system for proofs of knowledge for R". Before doing so, we recall and introduce some standard notations.
The proof systems we define are two-party protocols. The two parties in the protocol are called the prover and the verifier. For the purpose of defining "proof of knowledge" there is no need to impose any computational restrictions on either parties, although in specific applications computation restrictions may be added for other purposes (see Remark 9 below). The heart of the proof system is the verifier, which remains fixed for our entire discussion. This fixed verifier may interact with arbitrary provers, and we will relate the behaviour of the verifier in these interactions with assertions concerning knowledge of the corresponding provers.
We stress that we make no assumptions concerning the possible provers. We don't even assume that they send messages that can be computed (say nothing about efficiently computed) from the information they receive (i.e., their initial input and in-coming messages).
2That there exists a polynomial p such that (x, y) E R implies Iyl < p(lx!), a.nd tha.t there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding membership in R.
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We therefore prefer to refer to such a prover by the term interactive function rather then use the conventional term interactive machine. Hence, as far as we are concerned the messages sent by a particular prover P* are an arbitrary function of the common input, denoted x, and the messages received so far (from the verifier). This function, denoted msgp·,x' may depend also on auxiliary inputs (including random inputs) given to the prover together with the common input. The function msgp.,x : {O, 1}*1---+ {O, 1}* is defined so that msgp. AO:ll ... ,O:t) is the t + 1 st message sent by P* when interacting with V on common input ~, where O:j (1 ~ i ~ t) is the i th message that P* received from V. We stress that probabilistic polynomial-time provers with auxiliary input depending on the common input (e.g. getting a satisfying assignment for a CNF formula which is common input) are treated as a special case. To discuss such a probabilistic polynomial-time prover, p*, we consider an infinite set of provers each being an infinite object, denoted P~,p, that represents the behaviour of p* on each common input x when given o:(x) as auxiliary input and p(x) as random input. This entire convention is not essential to the definition (see Remark 1) .
The knowledge of a prover is supposed to be reflected by the transcript of its interaction with the verifier (leading the verifier to accept) and by the probability that the verifier accepts. The transcript of such interaction contains the sequence of message exchanged during the interaction, but not information which is available only to one party (e.g., its internal coin tosses in case they were not send to the counterpart). We stress that the transcript of the interaction is different from each party's view of the interaction (referred to in the definition of zero-knowledge)3. We assume, for simplicity, that the transcript contains the verifier's verdict on whether to accept or reject. Hence, for each x, we may talk of the set of accepting transcripts, denoted ACCv( x), and the set of rejecting transcripts, denoted REJv( x). By trp. y( x) we denote the random variable assigned values which are transcripts of the interaction of P* with V on common input x. This random variable is defined over the sample space of all possible outcomes for the internal coin tosses of V.
Before we proceed, we remind the reader that our aim is not to define the "knowledge of P* about x" but rather the "knowledge of P* about x which may be deduced from the intemction of P* with V (on input x)". Clearly, this knowledge contains the transcript of the interaction. Yet, in case the interaction is accepting and this event is not incidental, one can say more on the knowledge of P*. Namely, the ability of P* to "often" lead the verifier to accept may say something about the knowledge of P*. The crucial observation, originating in [11] , is that the "knowledge of P* about x (deduced by interaction)" can be captured by whatever can be efficiently computed on input x, an accepting transcript 7, and access to the oracle msgp.,x' At this point, giving 7 as input may seem redundant, since it may be computed using the oracle. In all reasonable cases giving 7 is indeed redundant, yet we postpone the discussion of this point to Remark 6.
The phrase "efficiently computed on input x, transcript 7 and access to an oracle msgp. ,x" is made precise in the definition of a "knowledge extractor". The straightforward approach is to require that the knowledge extractor is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine. Indeed this is the approach taken in previous works (if one translates their ideas to this slightly different setting). We will replace the strict requirement that the knowledge extractor works in polynomial-time by a more adaptive requirement which relates the running time of the knowledge extractor with the probability that the verifier is convinced. The advantages of this approach have been discussed in the introduction and will be further discussed below. We are now ready to present the main definition.
3Each party ca.n deduce the tra.nscript from its view of the interaction, but not necessa.rily vice versa..
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3Each party ca.n deduce the tra.nscript from its view of the interaction, but not necessa.rily vice versa.. • completeness (or non-triviality): There exists an interactive function P so that for all x E LR all possible interactions of V with P on common input x are accepting (i.e.
Pr (trp,v(x) EACCv(x)) = 1).
• soundness (or validity): There exists a constant c > 0 and a probabilistic oracle machine K such that for every interactive function P*, every x E {0,1}* and every "y E ACCv (x) machine K satisfies the following condition: 
The oracle machine J( is called a universal knowledge extractor.
The soundness condition stated above implies that for every x f/. LR the probability that V accepts on common input x is bounded above by ((Ixl) (since otherwise it follows that machine J( outputs yE R(x) while no such y exists). In other words, there is a gap between the probability that a prover may convince the verifier on x E LR (which by the completeness condition is exactly 1) and the probability that a prover may convince the verifier on x f/. LR (which as just said is at most ((Ix!)). However, the soundness condition requires much more than just unlikelihood of convincing the verifier on x f/. LR: it requires also a relation between the probability that the prover convinces the verifier on x E LR and the expected time it takes the knowledge extractor to find ayE R( x). The smaller the function ( is, the tighter this relation is.
Remarks
We start with the following conventions. We call a function f : N I-t R negligible if for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large n we have f( n) < :c' We call a function f : N I-t R nonnegligible if there exists c > 0 so that for all sufficiently large n we have f( n) ~ :c. (Similar terminology is used for functions f: {O, I}· I-t R.) As stressed above, non-negligible is not the negation of negligible but rather a very strong negation of it (and there exist functions which are nei ther negligible nor non-negligi ble). • completeness (or non-triviality): There exists an interactive function P so that for all x E LR all possible interactions of V with P on common input x are accepting (i.e.
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Primary Remarks Remark 1 (provers which are interactive turing machines and even efficient ones):
A closer look at the definition should eliminate the uneasy feeling caused by the fact that it refers to provers which have infinite description and hence are not necessarily implementable by Turing machines (or any sort of algorithms). However, this convention (chosen for notational convenience) is not essential and a more traditional definition can be given. The following definition regards provers as probabilistic interactive Turing machines with an auxiliary input. The benefit in this convention is that it enables us to discuss the efficiency 5 of the prover guaranteed by the completeness condition. In particular, one may di.s~uss the important case of probabilistic polynomial-time provers which get YER(x) as amohary input (when x E LR is the common input). Let P" be a probabilistic interactive Turing machine. We denote by P"( a, p) the machine derived from P" by setting the contents of its auxiliary tape to a and its random tape to p. The alternative formulation of the completeness and soundness conditions follows .
• completeness (or non-triviality): There exists an interactive machine P so that for every x E LR there exists an auxiliary input ax such that for all pE {O, I}", all possible interactions of V with P( ax, p) on common input x are accepting.
• soundness (or validity): There exists a constant c > 0 and a probabilistic oracle machine K such that for every interactive machine p .. , every x,a,p E {a, I}" and every')' E ACCv( x), machine K satisfies the following condition: 6 of the prover guaranteed by the completeness condition. In particular, one may di.s~uss the important case of probabilistic polynomial-time provers which get YER(x) as amohary input (when x E LR is the common input). Let P" be a probabilistic interactive Turing machine. We denote by P"( a, p) the machine derived from P" by setting the contents of its auxiliary tape to a and its random tape to p. The alternative formulation of the completeness and soundness conditions follows .
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LR).
(The modification is to execute the deterministic algorithm for finding a witness to x in "parallel" to the normal execution of the knowledge extractor. By "in parallel" we mean that the algorithm alternatingly makes one step of each of the algorithms until one of the two algorithms terminates. Clearly the modified algorithm always halts, and furthermore the expected number of steps and the output are as claimed.)
Remark 5 (provers which convince with non-negligible probability): Clearly, if the verifier accepts with non-negligible probability and f. is negligible then the knowledge extractor runs in expected polynomial-time in Ixl and Iyl (which for relations R which are polynomiallybounded means expected running time polynomial in Ixl). This conclusion yields essentially what previous authors have considered as sufficient 7. Yet, as we have argued the conclusion by itself does not suffice.
Remark 6 (should the transcript be given to the knowledge extractor?):
In the all definitions presented above, the knowledge extractor is given both an accepting transcript l' E ACCv( x) and access to the oracle msgp. x. In case the messages sent by the verifier can , be computed in polynomial-time, giving l' to the knowledge extractor is redundant. (We ~The statement follows by combining Remark 3 with the fact, proven in [13, 10] , that zero-knowledge proofs systems with no error in the soundness condition exist only for languages in BPP.
6In general, to maintain zero-knowledge property, the protocol has to be iterated sequentially (d. [8] ).
However, if it suffices that the resulting protocol is witness-indistinguishable then the iterations can be made in parallel (d. [4] ).
7To be slightly more accura.te, in some previous works it is required that if the verifier accepts with constant/non-negligible probability then a strictly polynomial-time knowledge extractor should output a witness with constant/non-negligible probability. It can be easily shown that this requirement is equivalent to requiring that if the verifier accepts with constant/non-negligible probability then an expected polynomialtime knowledge extractor always outputs a witness. 7 which case any polynomial-time machine on input x E LR trivially "knows" yE R' (x) for some R' satisfying LR = LR/) 5. Hence, the function f. is essential for the existence of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for relations which characterize intractable languages (i.e., for R so that LR f/. BPP).
2. Yet, as far as efficient knowledge verifiers are concerned, the fu~ction f. can be made negligible and even, for every c > 0, assume the form f.( n) = 2-n . The knowledge error ir reduced by using a different knowledge verifier, yet without damaging other properties of the verifier and the potential provers such as efficiency, zero-knowledgeness etc. This is achieved by running the original protocol sufficiently many times 6 • Further details can be found in Appendix C. 
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The statement follows by combining Remark 3 with the fact, proven in [13, 10] , that zero-knowledge proofs systems with no error in the soundness condition exist only for languages in BPP.
7To be slightly more accura.te, in some previous works it is required that if the verifier accepts with constant/non-negligible probability then a strictly polynomial-time knowledge extractor should output a witness with constant/non-negligible probability. It can be easily shown that this requirement is equivalent to requiring that if the verifier accepts with constant/non-negligible probability then an expected polynomialtime knowledge extractor always outputs a witness. 7 stress that we do not require here that the verifier itself is polynomial-time!) This is the case in all known applications of proof of knowledge. Yet, if this condition does not hold the two alternatives (i.e. giving 'Y to the extractor or not) seem to be nonequivalent, and a choice must be made. Our choice is mainly motivated by the applications in which a proof of knowledge is used as a subprotocol (these applications were our primary motivation in suggesting the new definition). In these cases the knowledge verifier has the transcript of the interaction and his beliefs about the knowledge of the prover may rightfully refer to this transcript. Note that it might be the case that the prover gained knowledge via interaction with the knowledge-verifier. In particular applications where this is not desirable, it must be claimed that this is not the case: namely that the knowledge-verifier gives no knowledge to the prover (i.e., is zero-knowledge 8 ) .
Remark 7 (what should be the running-time of the knowledge extractor?):
The above definition does not refer to the running time of the verifier. Yet, restrictions are placed on the running time of the knowledge extractor. Furthermore, the knowledge extractor does not run in time which depends on the running time of the verifier. This is justified from a conceptual point of view, since letting the knowledge extractor run in time which is polynomial in the running time of the verifier would have reflected the "knowledge of the verifier about the knowledge of the prover" and not the "knowledge of the prover". The "knowledge of the verifier about the knowledge of the prover" may be more than the "knowledge of the prover". Consider for example a polynomial-time prover interacting with an exponentialtime verifier on common input a prime p. The prover may select a primitive element g E Z;, an integer x < p, compute y = gX mod p and prove to the verifier that "he knows the discrete logarithm of y mod p to base g". The verifier, may compute (and thus "know") also z satisfying x =gZ mod p, whereas the prover "does not know z". The practical justifications to our choice are all the cases in which a proof of knowledge is presented to an ultimately powerful verifier (cf. Subsection 4.1 and [2]).
Remark 8 (one thing that the knowledge extractor can do):
In all examples we are aware of, the knowledge extractor proceeds by trying to find several (not more than polynomially many) related accepting transcripts. For example, the knowledge extractor presented in Appendix A tries to find a single accepting transcript in addition to the one given as input. Clearly such knowledge extractors succeed within an expected number of steps which is inversely proportional to the density of the accepting transcripts (which is in other words the accepting probability). Note that if the proof of knowledge is zero-knowledge then a single accepting transcript (and in particular the one given as input) can not suffice! Remark 9 (super-polynomial-time provers): As said above, for the purpose of defining proofs of knowledge, there is no need to restrict the prover to polynomial-time. This is another point on which we disagree with some previous works which claimed that it makes no sense to talk of the knowledge of unrestricted machines. The definition is presented without assuming anything about the power of the prover, and it is a corollary that machines with no time bounds may know facts which cannot be deduced in (say) double exponential time (and so on). In particular, it is meaningful to say that the prover in Shamir's interactive proof 8 As claimed in [7] , one may decouple the zero-knowledge property from the specific interactive proof setting. An interactive program (regardless of its other roles) is said to be zero-knowledge on a specific set of inputs if its interaction with any other interactive machine on these inputs can be efficiently simulated by a non-interactive machine.
8 stress that we do not require here that the verifier itself is polynomial-time!) This is the case in all known applications of proof of knowledge. Yet, if this condition does not hold the two alternatives (i.e. giving 'Y to the extractor or not) seem to be nonequivalent, and a choice must be made. Our choice is mainly motivated by the applications in which a proof of knowledge is used as a subprotocol (these applications were our primary motivation in suggesting the new definition). In these cases the knowledge verifier has the transcript of the interaction and his beliefs about the knowledge of the prover may rightfully refer to this transcript. Note that it might be the case that the prover gained knowledge via interaction with the knowledge-verifier. In particular applications where this is not desirable, it must be claimed that this is not the case: namely that the knowledge-verifier gives no knowledge to the prover (i.e., is zero-knowledge 8 ) .
Remark 7 (what should be the running-time of the knowledge extractor?):
Remark 8 (one thing that the knowledge extractor can do):
In all examples we are aware of, the knowledge extractor proceeds by trying to find several (not more than polynomially many) related accepting transcripts. For example, the knowledge extractor presented in Appendix A tries to find a single accepting transcript in addition to the one given as input. Clearly such knowledge extractors succeed within an expected number of steps which is inversely proportional to the density of the accepting transcripts (which is in other words the accepting probability). Note that if the proof of knowledge is zero-knowledge then a single accepting transcript (and in particular the one given as input) can not suffice! Remark 9 (super-polynomial-time provers): As said above, for the purpose of defining proofs of knowledge, there is no need to restrict the prover to polynomial-time. This is another point on which we disagree with some previous works which claimed that it makes no sense to talk of the knowledge of unrestricted machines. The definition is presented without assuming anything about the power of the prover, and it is a corollary that machines with no time bounds may know facts which cannot be deduced in (say) double exponential time (and so on). In particular, it is meaningful to say that the prover in Shamir's interactive proof system for a PSPACE-complete language, knows an accepting computation of a polynomialspace machine which accepts the common input. This indeed can be proven using our definitions (see Subsection 4.2).
Secondary Remarks
Remark 10 (relaxing the completeness requirement): The prover guaranteed by the completeness requirement must convince the verifier in all interactions of x E LR. This requirement, met in all known protocols, is not essential to the definition of proof of knowledge. In general one may require that the existence of a prover that convinces the verifier, on input x, with probability C(lxl). As far as polynomial-time (or even more powerful) verifiers are concerned any choice of two bounds, specified by polynomial-time constructable functions C, f: N ~ [0, 1] with difference (i.e. ~(n) 19fC(n)-f( n)) which is non-negligible and bounded above by a function of the form Uc(n) = 1-2-nc for some c > 0, is equivalent. When saying that these choices are equivalent, as long as the above requirements are satisfied, we mean that existence of a verifier which satisfies one pair of permissible bounds yields the existence of another verifier which satisfies the second pair of bounds. Furthermore, the complexity both of the verifier and of the prover (meeting the completeness condition) is preserved (and so are zero-knowledge properties). In fact, following the ideas in [5] , one can eliminate the error probability in the completeness condition altogether and derive the definition as in the previous section. However, the last transformation does not .necessarily preserve the complexity of the prover and its zero-knowledge property.
Remark 11 (an argument for alternative terminology):
We feel that the soundness condition in the above definition is much stronger in nature than the soundness condition in the definition of an interactive proof system. Hence, we suggest to give it a different name, validity. Validity is an accurate statement which, for every prover, relates the behavior of the prover and the knowledge extractor on all inputs (not just those not in LR); whereas soundness in interactive proofs merely refers to the behaviour of the prover on inputs not in the language. Likewise, we prefer the term non-triviality to completeness.
Remark 12 (universality of the knowledge extractor):
In the above definition we require the existence of a universal knowledge extractor which works for all possible provers P*. Switching the quantifiers (i.e. requiring that for every P* there exist a knowledge extractor K*) would make little sense in practice since P* in our conventions may depend on the coin tosses of a "real" prover (see Remark 1). However, adopting the alternative formalization of Remark 1, even only with respect to the coin tosses, allows to formulate a more liberal definition (in which the quantifiers are switched) which makes sense 9 • Note that the knowledge extractor is required to be polynomial-time and hence, even in the "liberal" alternative, if one wishes to discuss super-polynomial-time provers then oracle access to msgp. x must be , given (since in this case the oracle cannot be "incorporated" into the extractor).
Examples
In this section we present two applications to which our definition of "proof of knowledge" can be applied, whereas the previous formalizations fail. 9 system for a PSPACE-complete language, knows an accepting computation of a polynomialspace machine which accepts the common input. This indeed can be proven using our definitions (see Subsection 4.2).
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Remark 10 (relaxing the completeness requirement): The prover guaranteed by the completeness requirement must convince the verifier in all interactions of x E LR. This requirement, met in all known protocols, is not essential to the definition of proof of knowledge. In general one may require that the existence of a prover that convinces the verifier, on input x, with probability C(lxl). As far as polynomial-time (or even more powerful) verifiers are concerned any choice of two bounds, specified by polynomial-time constructable functions C, f: N~[0, 1] with difference (i.e.~(n) 19fC(n)-f(n)) which is non-negligible and bounded above by a function of the form Uc(n) = 1-2-nc for some c > 0, is equivalent. When saying that these choices are equivalent, as long as the above requirements are satisfied, we mean that existence of a verifier which satisfies one pair of permissible bounds yields the existence of another verifier which satisfies the second pair of bounds. Furthermore, the complexity both of the verifier and of the prover (meeting the completeness condition) is preserved (and so are zero-knowledge properties). In fact, following the ideas in [5] , one can eliminate the error probability in the completeness condition altogether and derive the definition as in the previous section. However, the last transformation does not .necessarily preserve the complexity of the prover and its zero-knowledge property.
Remark 11 (an argument for alternative terminology):
Remark 12 (universality of the knowledge extractor):
In the above definition we require the existence of a universal knowledge extractor which works for all possible provers P*. Switching the quantifiers (i.e. requiring that for every p. there exist a knowledge extractor K*) would make little sense in practice since P* in our conventions may depend on the coin tosses of a "real" prover (see Remark 1). However, adopting the alternative formalization of Remark 1, even only with respect to the coin tosses, allows to formulate a more liberal definition (in which the quantifiers are switched) which makes sense 9 • Note that the knowledge extractor is required to be polynomial-time and hence, even in the "liberal" alternative, if one wishes to discuss super-polynomial-time provers then oracle access to msgp. x must be , given (since in this case the oracle cannot be "incorporated" into the extractor).
Examples
In this section we present two applications to which our definition of "proof of knowledge" can be applied, whereas the previous formalizations fail. 4.1 Zero-Knowledge proof of Graph Non-Isomorphism I first realized the inadequacy of previous formulations of "proofs of knowledge" when Leonid Levin insisted that the zero-knowledge interactive proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism (of [9] ) should be presented in a modular manner. (For sake of self-containment this protocol is presented in Appendix A). As many people noticed, the intuition behind this zero-knowledge proof is that the verifier first proves to the prover that it "knows" an isomorphism between one of the input graphs and the query graph that it presents to the prover
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. If the prover is convinced then it answers the query by indicated to which of the two input graphs the query graph is isomorphism (and by doing so supplies statistical evidence that the two input graphs are indeed not isomorphic). It should be stressed that this intuitive idea, taken from the Quadratic Non-Residousity zero-knowledge proof of [11] , has indeed guided the development of the zero-knowledge proof system for GNI but plays no part in the formal description appearing in [9] . Levin complained, rightfully, against this inelegant and non-modular approach. My answer, at the time, was that an elegant proof which uses the subprotocol and its properties in a modular fashion is not possible due to lack of appropriate definitions.
One definition that was lacking at the time was that of the information hiding property of the subprotocol used to prove "possession of knowledge". Specifically, that subprotocol, which consists of the parallel version of the zero-knowledge proof of Graph Isomorphism, is not known to be zero-knowledge (and in light of [8J it is unlikely that a proof that it is zeroknowledge can ever be given). Nevertheless, this subprotocol is "witness indistinguishable" (in the sense defined latter by Feige and Shamir [4] ) and this property suffices to the soundness of the interactive proof of GNI. However this entire issue is irrelevant to the current note.
The other definition that was lacking at that time was an adequate definition of a proof of knowledge. An adequate definition of a "proof of knowledge" is needed to ensure that if the GNI-prover is convinced that the GNI-verifier "knows" an isomorphism between the query graph and one of the input graphs then indicating to which input graph the query graph is isomorphic yields no knowledge to the GNI-verifier ll . To this end, the simulator (constructed to meet the zero-knowledge clause) uses the knowledge extractor guaranteed by the definition of a "proof of knowledge". However, as pointed out above, previous definitions of "proof of knowledge" are useless in the case the GNI-prover is not convinced with nonnegligible probability. It follows that the simulator will fail to construct the interactions in these cases which may occur with probability that is neither non-negligible nor negligible (see discussion above). In particular, consider the situation where for every c > 0 there exists an infinite sequence of inputs to the protocol such that on input of length n the GNI-prover is convinced with probability ~c.
On the other hand, one can show that the subprotocol "for proof of knowledge of isomorphism" (presented in [9J and Appendix A) constitutes a proof of knowledge, with knowledge error f(n) = 2· 2-t (n), according to the definition presented in Section 2. Using Remark 4, it follows that the running time of the knowledge extractor is inversely proportional to the probability that the GNI-prover is convinced. Hence, the simulator for the GNI-protocol will run in expected polynomial-time and produce a perfect simulation of the interaction. 10 4.1 Zero-Knowledge proof of Graph Non-Isomorphism I first realized the inadequacy of previous formulations of "proofs of knowledge" when Leonid Levin insisted that the zero-knowledge interactive proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism (of [9] ) should be presented in a modular manner. (For sake of self-containment this protocol is presented in Appendix A). As many people noticed, the intuition behind this zero-knowledge proof is that the verifier first proves to the prover that it "knows" an isomorphism between one of the input graphs and the query graph that it presents to the prover
The other definition that was lacking at that time was an adequate definition of a proof of knowledge. An adequate definition of a "proof of knowledge" is needed to ensure that if the GNI-prover is convinced that the GNI-verifier "knows" an isomorphism between the query graph and one of the input graphs then indicating to which input graph the query graph is isomorphic yields no knowledge to the GNI-verifier ll . To this end, the simulator (constructed to meet the zero-knowledge clause) uses the knowledge extractor guaranteed by the definition of a "proof of knowledge". However, as pointed out above, previous definitions of "proof of knowledge" are useless in the case the GNI-prover is not convinced with nonnegligible probability. It follows that the simulator will fail to construct the interactions in these cases which may occur with probability that is neither non-negligible nor negligible (see discussion above). In particular, consider the situation where for every c > 0 there exists an infinite sequence of inputs to the protocol such that on input of length n the GNI-prover is convinced with probability~c'
On the other hand, one can show that the subprotocol "for proof of knowledge of isomorphism" (presented in [9J and Appendix A) constitutes a proof of knowledge, with knowledge error f(n) = 2· 2-t (n), according to the definition presented in Section 2. Using Remark 4, it follows that the running time of the knowledge extractor is inversely proportional to the probability that the GNI-prover is convinced. Hence, the simulator for the GNI-protocol will run in expected polynomial-time and produce a perfect simulation of the interaction.
Furthermore, it can be easily shown that the GNI-prover while playing the role of the G/-verifier in the proof of knowledge yields no knowledge to the GNI-verifier (since its messages are generated in probabilistic polynomial-time from its inputs).
What does the prover of a PSPACE language know?
Using our definition, it is possible to say that the verifier in Shamir's interactive proof for a PSPACE-complete language L is a knowledge verifier for the relation RL consisting of pairs (x, Cl ••• C2t) where t = poly( Ix I) and Cl, C2, ••. , C2t is a sequence of configurations of a fixed machine accepting x E L. Hence, one can say that (in some meaningful sense) any prover which convinces this verifier (with, say, probability 1) on input x, does know an accepting computation on input x. To make the statement more appealing/intuitive we restrict ourselves to saying that any prover which convinces the above verifier knows the middle configuration in such an accepting computation.
Let us show how a knowledge extractor may find the middle configuration. For the rest of this subsection, we assume that the reader is very familiar with the interactive proof for QBF as presented in [14] section 5. The standard reduction of a PSPACE language to QBF associates the middle configuration in an accepting poly-space computation with the first block of t existential quantifiers in the formula. So in the rest of this subsection we will consider only the problem of retrieving a sequence of truth-values so that assigning these values to the above mentioned variables yields value true for the resulting formula.
First, we consider a straightforward method for retrieving these t boolean values. This method does work in case the prover convinces the verifier with probability 1 (but will have to be modified to deal with arbitrary provers). First the knowledge extractor asks the oracle for the first message of the prover which is a pair (P, vo), where P is a large prime and Vo is a non-zero residue mod P (the value of the arithmetic expression mod P). Next, the knowledge extractor proceeds in t rounds. In the i th round, the extractor feeds the oracle the sequence Tl, ... , Ti-l E Zp and gets the polynomial, Pi, which corresponds to the opening of the i th variable, when the previous i-I variables are set to T}, ... , Ti-l, respectively. The extractor then finds a J.Li E {O, I} so that Pi(J.Li) is not equal to zero modulo P (such J.Li must exist since L Il E{O,I) Pi(J.L) == Vi-I'" 0 (mod P). Round i is completed by setting Ti = J.Li and Vi = Pi(Ti).
In general the above method may fail as it relies too heavily on the answers of the' prover on boolean Ti'S. An alternative approach is to select the Ti'S uniformly in Zp. The problem is that the resulting residual arithmetic expression no longer reflects the truth value of the residual boolean formula. To solve the problem we need to find the polynomial resulting by setting the Ti'S to J.Li'S by examining the polynomials which result by random settings of the Ti'S. To see how this can be done, we need to take a closer look at the formula used by Shamir and its arithmetization. It can be seen that the polynomial Pi received from the prover in round i has coefficients which are polynomials in Tl through can be found via "interpolation" at 2t uniformly selected (yet dependent) points. Finally, we note that the knowledge extractor can tell whether it is given the correct polynomial at a point by carrying on the rest of the interactive proof using the oracle to the function msgpo ,x' Further details are omitted.
Finding the values of the variables in the following blocks of existential quantifiers (which 11 Furthermore, it can be easily shown that the GNI-prover while playing the role of the G/-verifier in the proof of knowledge yields no knowledge to the GNI-verifier (since its messages are generated in probabilistic polynomial-time from its inputs).
Using our definition, it is possible to say that the verifier in Shamir's interactive proof for a PSPACE-complete language L is a knowledge verifier for the relation RL consisting of pairs (x, Cl ••• C2t) where t = poly( Ix I) and Cl, C2, ... , C2t is a sequence of configurations of a fixed machine accepting x E L. Hence, one can say that (in some meaningful sense) any prover which convinces this verifier (with, say, probability 1) on input x, does know an accepting computation on input x. To make the statement more appealing/intuitive we restrict ourselves to saying that any prover which convinces the above verifier knows the middle configuration in such an accepting computation. Let us show how a knowledge extractor may find the middle configuration. For the rest of this subsection, we assume that the reader is very familiar with the interactive proof for QBF as presented in [14] section 5. The standard reduction of a PSPACE language to QBF associates the middle configuration in an accepting poly-space computation with the first block of t existential quantifiers in the formula. So in the rest of this subsection we will consider only the problem of retrieving a sequence of truth-values so that assigning these values to the above mentioned variables yields value true for the resulting formula.
In general the above method may fail as it relies too heavily on the answers of the' prover on boolean Ti'S. An alternative approach is to select the Ti'S uniformly in Zp. The problem is that the resulting residual arithmetic expression no longer reflects the truth value of the residual boolean formula. To solve the problem we need to find the polynomial resulting by setting the Ti'S to J.Li'S by examining the polynomials which result by random settings of the Ti'S. To see how this can be done, we need to take a closer look at the formula used by Shamir and its arithmetization. It can be seen that the polynomial Pi received from the prover in round i has coefficients which are polynomials in Tl through Appendix A: The zero-knowledge proof of Graph Non-Isomorphism . Following is the basic ingredient of the zero-knowledge proof for Graph Non-IsomorphIsm (GN 1) presented in [9] .
Input: Two graphs G I and G 2 of n vertices each. Objective: In case the graphs are not isomorphism, supply (statistical) evidence to that affect.
Step Vl: The GNI-verifier selects uniformly i E {1,2}, and a random isomorphic copy of Gi, hereafter denoted H and called the qu.ery. Namely, H is obtained by selecting a random permutation 11", over the vertex-set, and letting the edge-set of H consist of pairs (11"( 11.), 11"(v)) for every pair (11., v) in the edge-set of Gi.
Step VP: The GNI-verifier "convinces" the GNI-prover that he (i.e., the GNI-verifier) "knows" an isomorphism between H and one of the input graphs. To this end the two parties execute a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for graph isomorphism (described below). In that proof of knowledge the GNI-verifier acts as the prover while the GNI-prover acts as the verifier.
Step Pl: If the GNI-prover is convinced by the proof given at step VP, he finds j such that H is isomorphic to Gj, and sends j to the GNI-verifier. (If H is isomorphic to neither graphs or to both the verifier sets j = 1 (this choice is arbitrary).)
Step V2: If j (received in step PI) equals i (chosen in step VI) then the GNI-verifier accepts, else he rejects.
It is easy to see that if the input graphs are not isomorphic then there exists a GNIprover which always convinces the GNI-verifier. This meets the completeness condition of interactive proofs. To show that some sort of soundness is achieved we use the witness indistinguishability of the subprotocol used in Step VP. Loosely speaking, it follows that no information about i is revealed to the GNI-prover and therefore if the input graphs are isomorphic then the GNI-verifier rejects with probability at least one half (no matter what the prover does)I2.
The demonstration that the GNI-prover is zero-knowledge is the place where the notion of proof of knowledge plays a central role. As required by the zero-knowledge condition we have to construct, for every efficient program playing the role of the GNI-verifier, an efficient simulator which outputs a distribution equal to that of the interaction of the verifier program with the GNI-prover. To that end, the simulator uses the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge (taking place in step VP) in order to find the isomorphism between the query graph and one of the input graphs. Once this isomorphism is found producing the rest of the interaction (i.e., the bit j) is obvious. (Carrying out this plan is not possible when using previous definitions of "proof of knowledge" and is indeed possible when using our definition.)
To complete the description of the above protocol we present a (witness indistinguishable) proof of knowledge of Graph Isomorphism. This proof of knowledge can be easily adapted to a proof of knowledge of an isomorphism between the first input graph and one of two other input graphs.
Input: Two graphs Hand G of n vertices each. Objective: In case the graphs are isomorphism, the GI-prover has to "prove knowledge of 1/J", where 1/J is an isomorphism between Hand G.
Remark: Note that in our application the GNI-verifier plays the role of the GI-prover, 12Reducing the cheating probability further can be done by iterating the above protocol either sequentially or in parallel. However, this is not our concern here. 14 Appendix A: The zero-knowledge proof of Graph Non-Isomorphism . Following is the basic ingredient of the zero-knowledge proof for Graph Non-IsomorphIsm (GN 1) presented in [9] . Input: Two graphs G I and G 2 of n vertices each. Objective: In case the graphs are not isomorphism, supply (statistical) evidence to that affect.
Remark: Note that in our application the GNI-verifier plays the role of the GI-prover, 12Reducing the cheating probability further can be done by iterating the above protocol either sequentially or in parallel. However, this is not our concern here. 14 Technion -Computer Science Department -Tehnical Report CS0710.revised -1991 while the GNI-prover plays the role of the GI-verifier.
• deC ( ) deC 2 NotatIon: Let t =t n =n .
Step pI: The GI-prover selects uniformly t random isomorphic copies of H, denoted K 1l ..., K t and called the mediators. Namely, K i is obtained by selecting a random permutation 1ri, over the vertex-set, and letting the edge-set of Ki consist of pairs ( 1r i(U), 1r i(V))
for every pair (u, v) in the edge-set of H.
Step vI: The GI-verifier selects uniformly a subset S of {I, 2, ... , t} and sends S to the GI-prover.
Step p2: For every iE S, the GI-prover sets ai = 1ri, where 1ri is the permutation selected in step pI to form Ki. For every i E {I, ... , t}-S, the GI-prover sets ai = 1ri"P, where 1ri is as before, ' l /J is the isomorphism between G and H (known to the GI-prover), and 1r' l/J denotes composition of permutations (or isomorphisms). The GI-prover sends al,a2, ... ,at to the GI-verifier.
Step v2: The GI-verifier checks if, for every i E S, the permutation ai (supplied in step p2) is indeed an isomorphism between the graphs Hand Ki. In addition, the GI-verifier checks if, for every i E {1,2, ... ,t}-S, the permutation ai (supplied in step p2) is indeed an isomorphism between the graphs G and Ki. If both conditions are satisfied (Le. all t permutations are indeed what they are supposed to be) then the GI-verifier accepts (Le. is convinced that the GI-prover knows an isomorphism between G and H).
One can show that the above verifier constitutes a knowledge-verifier for Graph Isomorphism with knowledge-error 2 . 2-t (n). This is done by fixing the coin tosses of the prover (hence fixing the graphs K 1 , ... '!<t) and considering all possible choices of S ~ {1,2, ... , t}.
Denote by s the number of subsets S for which the GI-verifier accepts. A knowledge extractor, given one accepting interaction (i.e., containing a good S) tries to find another one (i.e. a good subset different from S). Having two good subsets clearly yields an isomorphism between G and H (Le., using any index in the symmetric difference between the good subsets). Clearly, if s = 1 then there exists no good subset other than S. Yet, for any s > 1, the expected number of tries required to find a different good subset is ~l~ll < ~~l' As ¥ is the probability that the GI-verifier accepts, our claim follows.
Appendix B: Previous Definitions of Proof of Knowledge
For sake of self-containment we review below the definitions of "proof of knowledge" appearing in the literature. In general there are two slightly different approaches, originating in [3] and [15] , respectively. "Proof of Knowledge" according to Feige, Fiat and Shamir [3] The definition presented in [3] refers only to parties which work in probabilistic polynomialtime, yet may have auxiliary input (which is not necessarily generated efficiently). The knowledge extractor is given the prover's program and auxiliary input and may run the prover's program as a subroutine (yet being charged for the time)13. The knowledge extractor is required to produce good output only for provers and inputs for which the prover has a non-negligible probability of convincing the verifier on that input. Specifically, it is required that for every constant a > 0 there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time extractor AI so that for all constants b> 0, all provers P", and all sufficiently large x,r,k if Pr((P", V)(x,r,k)=ACC) > W
IJThe extractor may try to analyze the prover's program by other means but Feige, Fiat and Shamir claim that this does not make sense. In any case the knowledge extractors that they present only use the prover's program as a "black-box".
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One can show that the above verifier constitutes a knowledge-verifier for Graph Isomorphism with knowledge-error 2 . 2-t (n). This is done by fixing the coin tosses of the prover (hence fixing the graphs K 1 , ... ,I<t) and considering all possible choices of S~{1,2, ... , t}.
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then Pr(M(desc(P*), x, r, k) E R(x)) > 1-~. (desc(P*) denotes the description of P*).
The string k in the [3] definition denotes a-priori knowledge of P* (given in the form of auxiliary input) where r denotes the prover's sequence of coin tosses. The fact that k is given to the knowledge extractor, though being indeed conceptually disturbing, can be justified in several applications (and in particular those in [3] ). We stress that the definition of [3] does not guarantee one knowledge extractor which works regardless of the prover's success probability but rather a sequence of extractors each relevant for a different "measure" of non-negligence. As claimed in the our text this is conceptually unsatisfactory and inadequate for many applications in which a proof of knowledge are used as a subroutine. It should be said that "proof of knowledge" are not used as subprotocols in [3] , but rather as the "thing itself" (and hence our critic of their definition is only weakly relevant, if at all, to the results of that paper).
"Proof of Knowledge" according to Tompa and Woll [15J The definition presented in [15] slightly differs from the one of [3] . It allows the verifier to run arbitrary (not necessarily polynomial) time. The running time of the knowledge extractor is polynomial in the length of the input and in the running time of the verifier. As explained in Remark 7, we don't believe that this choice is justified. The knowledge extractor in the [15J definition is given as input the prover's view of the interaction with the verifier, which contains among other things the prover's auxiliary input (denoted k in the definition of [3] presented above). The requirement concerning the output of the verifier is that the event "on input x the verifier is convinced yet the knowledge extractor fails to find y E R( x)" happens very rarely (Le. with probability smaller than f for some f < 1). The probability is taken over the random coin tosses of both parties (for any fixed input x and fixed auxiliary input k). Clearly, this definition suffers from all the disadvantages of the definition of [3] discussed above. Furthermore, if f is indeed fixed, as suggested by the definition in [15] , then protocols satisfying their definition are useless even in a stronger sense: the prover may convince the verifier with probability ~ and yet the knowledge extractor is required nothing. Tompa and Woll were indeed aware of this point and seem to suggest to eliminate the problem by applying the protocol iteratively sufficiently many times. This is indeed a good suggestion. However, several problems remain. First a conceptual problem: their Lemma 3 (hereafter referred to as the Composition Lemma) indeed offers a useful tool, but it does not provide a general satisfactory definition of a "proof of knowledge". More annoying is the fact that the Composition Lemma constructs better protocols via sequential composition of worse ones. It is not clear (and furthermore it seems unlikely) that a parallel composition will have the same affect. Finally, the Composition Lemma is applicable only to relations R which are in BPP.
